In a vertically differentiated industry a domestic and a foreign firm first choose the quality of their goods and then compete in quantities, or prices, in the home market. We investigate the cases in which a tariff is chosen before, or after, the firms' quality decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, respectively. Optimal ex-post tariffs are positive and ensure that the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic monopoly is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality.
. Introduction
In this paper we study the effect of import tariffs in a vertically differentiated industry where a foreign and a domestic firm sell in the home market. The firms first simultaneously choose the quality of their goods and then compete in the market. The government sets the tariff level before, or after, the firms' quality decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, 1 respectively. We show that in the ex-post tariff game the domestic firm always produces the high quality good independently of whether competition is in prices, or quantities. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic monopoly is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality. A tariff has important effects on long run quality investment and market structure. In response to any tariff a foreign firm always invests less in quality. The domestic firm, however, lowers (increases) quality investment if the tariff receiving foreign firm is low (high) quality.
Until recently the strategic trade policy literature has mainly focussed on imperfectly competitive homogenous, or horizontally differentiated, industries. The main insights from this literature are that strategic trade policy is sensitive to the patterns of competition and that optimal policy can vary depending on the mix of the policy instruments that one considers. The use of these instruments may be 2 to a government's advantage, although sometimes policy instruments are adopted 3, 4 even though they may be jointly suboptimal. In all these models the government decides on the level of the policy instrument before firms decide on their market strategies. These models thus implicitly assume government commitment to a specific policy level. Subsequent research on strategic trade policy has investigated the effect of the timing of moves on the choice of trade policies and domestic welfare. The principal contribution of this literature is the finding that optimal trade policy is sensitive to the timing of policy choice and that ex-ante subsidies 5 are generally welfare improving.
There are several reasons why vertical product differentiation models are worth analyzing. First, there is evidence that intra industry trade characterized by different levels of quality is a significant proportion of trade (see Greenaway et al., 1990 among others) . Given this it is surprising that little attention has been paid to 1 We use Neary's (1991) terminology. 2 Brander and Spencer (1984) show that an activist government can use tariffs as a welfare improving policy tool in an imperfectly competitive domestic market where a foreign and a domestic firm compete in quantities. They show that the decrease in consumer surplus is less than the joint increase in domestic firm's profits and tariff revenues.
3 Brander and Spencer (1985) , using a third-market model, show that the noncooperative equilibrium is characterized by positive production subsidies for both the exporting countries. Joint welfare of the producing nations would rise if the subsidy levels were reduced by both governments. Eaton and Grossman (1986) show that under Bertrand competition the optimal policy is a tax on exports.
4 Analysing anti-dumping and countervailing duties, Dixit (1988) has shown that the trade policy equilibrium implies both positive subsidies and tariffs. The domestic government can attain the first best outcome by using a tariff on imports and a subsidy towards domestic production to eliminate the oligopoly distortion and to shift rents to the domestic firm. If the government is restricted to using only tariffs then the (second-best) optimal tariff exceeds its fully optimal value. Also see Collie (1991) . Note, unlike Dixit we do not consider multiple instruments.
5 See for instance, Leahy and Neary (1994 , 1996 , 1999 in a duopolistic market whenever consumers have heterogenous tastes in quality. That is, one high and one low quality firm emerge in equilibrium. Investment in a long run variable (i.e. quality) and the existence of asymmetric qualities raises interesting questions for trade policy. Besides affecting investment in quality, trade policy also affects market structure. It can alter market structure by forcing the exit of the foreign firm, or result in quality switching (due to which the domestic firm always produces the high quality good). Quality reversals and exit due to government policies are unique to the vertical product differentiation models. In our model, quality switching may occur when the domestic government chooses its tariff level ex-post. Knowing that the higher its quality level, the higher the tariff will be ex-post, the foreign firm has little incentive to invest in quality and is always the low quality producer in the ex-post game. This is due to the fact that the domestic government moves second, and since investment in quality is sunk, the government can safely expropriate gross profits of the foreign firm by setting a high tariff level. Therefore, to guarantee positive net profits, a foreign firm (producing high quality under free trade), switches positions in the quality ladder and becomes the low quality producer instead.
The optimal ex-ante tariff is the prohibitive tariff that forces the exit of the foreign firm. A domestic monopoly is always obtained except for the case in which 8 firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality. Ex-post tariffs are always lower than ex-ante tariffs because the foreign firm, having a first mover advantage, can induce a lower tariff level by strategically investing less in quality.
9
Contrary to what has been shown for output subsidies, domestic welfare under ex-post tariffs is higher than under both ex-ante tariffs and free trade (except for the case pointed out above). This is due to the fact that in our model the government has at its disposal only one instrument to achieve three targets, i.e. to shift rents towards the domestic firm and to correct for the output and the quality investment distortions due to the firms' market power. The government has a 6 Trade policy instruments affect short run variables, such as prices and quantities, and also affect long run variables such as quality. For a discussion of the short-and long-term view of the rent transfer effect, and the difference between them, see Grossman (1988) .
7 This is a standard result in the literature on vertical differentiation, see e.g. Motta (1993) , Tirole (1989) , Shaked and Sutton (1982 , 1983 . 8 In this case, the optimal ex-ante tariff is positive and allows for low quality imports. 9 See, for example, Neary (1991) , Leahy and Neary (1994 , 1996 , 1999 .
second mover advantage in the ex-post game and achieves greater welfare by 10 setting its tariff level after the firms' quality decisions. Another important result in our paper is the effect of tariffs on quality investment by both the foreign and the domestic firm. Independently of whether a foreign firm produces low, or high, quality, it always invests less in quality in 11 response to any (ex-ante, or ex-post) tariff. The domestic firm invests less (more) in quality if the tariff receiving foreign firm produces the low (high) quality good. Tariffs soften competition for the domestic firm and affect long run variables, such as quality. Subsequently, profits for the domestic (foreign) firm increase (decrease) under any tariff.
In Section 2, we present the vertical product differentiation model under quantity competition with the free trade equilibrium quality, quantity, and welfare outcomes. In Section 3, the ex-post tariff game is analyzed and its outcome is compared to free trade. In Section 4, the ex-ante tariff game is analyzed and its outcome is compared to the ex-post game and free trade. In Section 5, we briefly discuss the results under Bertrand competition. Section 6 concludes. A detailed treatment of the Bertrand case is included in Appendix A.
. The basic model
There are two countries, one foreign and one domestic. Each has a firm that produces a vertically differentiated good to sell in the domestic market. Firms first simultaneously select the quality of their goods and then compete in the market by (simultaneously) setting their quantities. Quality is endogenous and s denotes the 1 high quality and s the low quality offered in the market (s $ s ). We concentrate 2 1 2 12 on the effects of import tariffs in the domestic market alone. There is a continuum of consumers in the domestic market, each identified by his taste ] parameter u, which is uniformly distributed over the interval f0,ug with density ] one; u then represents the size of the market. Each consumer has unitary demand for the good and a consumer with parameter u has utility: us 2 p if he buys one unit of the good of quality s s d
H 0 otherwise 10 It is important also to note that in this paper we do not consider tariffs ex-ante contingent on the quality of imports.
11 In a similar model and in response to a quantity restriction, quality downgrading is also shown (Herguera et al., 2000) . 12 This is a home market model as in Dixit (1988) and Collie (1991 domestic welfare when the foreign firm produces the high (low) quality good and the domestic firm the low (high) quality good. Note that under free trade, there are two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria. In one the domestic firm is the high 14 quality producer and in the other it is the low quality producer. The domestic firm's profits, as well as domestic welfare, are higher in the equilibrium in which the domestic firm is the high quality producer.
. Tariffs: The ex-post and the ex-ante game
Two alternative assumptions can be made regarding the timing of the policy decisions. First is the conventional assumption where the government chooses its level of policy instrument in the first stage of the game. Following Neary (1991) we refer to this case as the ex-ante game. In this game the government acts as a Stackelberg leader towards the firms setting the level of its policy instrument. Taking the government policy as given, the domestic and the foreign firm then act as Stackelberg followers and first choose their level of quality and then subsequently make their output decisions. Second, the government chooses its policy level before the market competition stage and after the firms have made their quality choices. Again, following Neary (1991) , we refer to this case as the ex-post game. Firms now act as Stackelberg leaders in their quality decisions. The government takes the firms' quality choices as given when it decides on its policy level.
A time consistency problem arises in the ex-ante game. Given that the government announces its policy level before the firms make their quality choices, the policy may be rendered suboptimal ex-post. Therefore, unless it possesses a 13 Domestic welfare is defined as the (unweighted) sum of the domestic firm's profits and consumer surplus. The latter consists of the net surplus of consumers purchasing the high, and the low, quality
good and is given by, CS 5 s u 2 u 2 x 2 p x 1 s u 2 x 2 u 2 x 2 x 2 p x .
14 There is also a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies where each firm chooses with some positive probability the higher quality good and otherwise chooses the lower quality good. In line with all the existing literature on vertical product differentiation, we abstain from the analysis of mixed strategy equilibria (see e.g. Tirole, 1989; Motta, 1993; Shaked and Sutton, 1982 , 1983 Sutton, 1991) . specific commitment mechanism, the government has an incentive to modify its trade policy after the firms have incurred their sunk costs of quality. Policy announcements in this scenario can be justified only if the domestic government can credibly commit to a level of the policy instrument.
The time consistency problem, however, does not arise in the ex-post game. The firms correctly anticipate the ex-post optimal policy and choose their quality levels accordingly. Contrary to the ex-ante game, here the firms act as Stackelberg leaders making their quality choices strategically to influence the government's choice of the policy instrument level in the subsequent stage.
In this paper, we consider that the government's policy instrument is a tariff on imports. We compare the outcomes of the ex-ante and the ex-post games with the benchmark free trade case. The solution concept employed to solve for the multi-stage game is subgame perfect equilibrium.
.1. Ex-post tariffs
In this section we analyze the ex-post tariff game and compare its equilibrium outcome with free trade. As mentioned above, there are two equilibria under free trade: (i) the foreign firm producing high quality and the domestic firm producing low quality, and (ii) vice versa.
Interestingly, in the ex-post tariff game, the foreign firm never produces the high quality good in equilibrium. In the unique equilibrium of this game, the domestic firm is always high quality. This occurs because a foreign firm (producing high quality under free trade), anticipating the optimal import tariff in the ex-post game, will switch positions in the quality ladder and instead produce the low quality good. The reason is quite simple. The foreign firm switches position in the quality ladder because it knows that under ex-post tariffs the government has a second mover advantage. If the foreign firm selects a high level of quality (incurring high sunk costs), the government, exploiting its second mover advantage, sets a high tariff thus expropriating the gross profits of the foreign firm. This would then result in negative net profits for the (high quality) foreign firm.
Below we analyze the two cases in which the foreign firm produces the high or the low quality good. We show that the foreign firm achieves positive (net) profits only as a low quality producer.
.1.1. High quality foreign firm
Let t be the per-unit output tariff imposed on the high quality foreign firm. Then the equilibrium profits are p t,s ,s 5 s x 2 , i 5 1,2.
Given the quality choices of the foreign and the domestic firm, the domestic government selects the ex-post tariff level that maximizes domestic welfare. Domestic welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, the domestic firm's profits and ] * tariff revenues (tux ). From (6) and (3), and manipulating, we get:
From the first order condition we obtain the optimal import tariff, t 5 u. The 3 optimal ex-post tariff is proportional to the foreign firm's quality level and ] increases with the size of the market, u. The higher the quality the foreign firm chooses in the first stage, the higher the import tariff will be and the lower will be, thus, its market share and profits. In fact, whenever the domestic firm is the low quality producer, the profits of the foreign firm are always negative independent of the quality level selected by the domestic firm in the first stage. The foreign firm thus has no incentive to produce the high quality good. These results are summarized in the following. anticipating that the government's ex-post optimal tariff will be t 5 u. ] 2 can be checked that the domestic firm never chooses a quality level s , 0.111u .
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From the first order condition of the domestic firm we observe that the optimal ] 2 quality for the domestic firm is always larger than 0.111u (the minimum attained at l 5 0, i.e. s 5 1`). Further, it can be checked that max p (s ,
] 2 s . 0.0568149u . Therefore, the foreign firm's profits are always negative 2 whenever the (low quality) domestic firm sets its quality level optimally. Thus the foreign firm never chooses to be the high quality producer under ex-post import tariffs. Q.E.D
.1.2. Low quality foreign firm
The analysis is similar to the case in which the foreign firm is of high quality. The domestic and the foreign firms' profits are p 5 p x ,x x 2 and p 5 s d and p s ,s 5 s x 2 . Then the first order conditions can be written as: (13), (12) and (11) we obtain the equilibrium qualities, quantities, profits, the optimal ex-post tariff and domestic welfare (note that H denotes the domestic firm and F the foreign firm): 
Proposition 2. Under ex-post optimal import tariffs, there is a unique equilibrium in which the foreign firm is always the low quality producer. Under ex-post tariffs the qualities offered by both the firms are lower than the equilibrium qualities under free trade. However, average quality and domestic welfare are always higher under ex-post tariffs than under free trade.
While the profits of the foreign firm are negative whenever it produces the high quality good, they are positive if it produces the low quality good. The foreign firm, knowing that the higher its quality level, the higher the optimal import tariff will be, strategically selects a lower quality in the first stage in order to induce a lower tariff level from the government in the subsequent stage. A foreign firm (producing the high quality good under free trade), anticipating the ex-post optimal ] ] * tariff t 5 s / 3 u (where s is its own quality), will switch position in the quality s d
F F
ladder and instead produce the low quality good. Contrarily, a low quality foreign 16 This is the unique real root of the equation that is smaller than one.
firm keeps producing the low quality good after the imposition of the ex-post optimal tariff. Quality switching is observed as the government chooses its tariff level after the foreign firm has invested in its quality. Since the foreign firm's gross profits are higher when it produces the high quality good, the government can raise more revenues by imposing a higher tariff on the (high quality) foreign firm. Under the optimal ex-post tariff both the high and the low quality offered in the market are lower than under free trade. The foreign firm, faced with the import tariff, offers a lower quality (relative to free trade) in order to save on costs of quality and thus obtain positive profits. As product differentiation increases, the domestic firm also saves on quality costs by offering a lower quality (relative to free trade). Despite the drop in what each firm offers, the average quality increases as the tariff shifts the market share from the low quality foreign firm to the high quality domestic firm. Nevertheless, the reduction in total output due to the imposition of the tariff outweighs the positive effect of the increase in average quality. As a result consumer surplus is lower than under free trade.
17
Domestic welfare is higher under ex-post tariffs than under free trade. The reason is that the introduction of an ex-post tariff shifts profits to the domestic firm and tariff revenues to the domestic government. The welfare increase is substantially stronger when the tariff induces a quality reversal due to a big increase in the domestic firm's profits. Our finding is in line with the Grossman (1988) critique that the long run view of the rent shifting effect may be different than the short run view given in Brander and Spencer (1985) . In fact in our long run scenario where firms first choose quality and then compete in the market, the rent shifting effect is reinforced due to the reversal in the equilibrium quality configuration induced by the ex-post tariff. With the ex-post tariff the domestic firm always produces the high quality good and hence the rent transfer effect is of a higher order of magnitude than the classic Brander and Spencer rent shifting effect.
.2. Ex-ante tariffs
Consider now the case where the government commits to an import tariff level before the firms (choosing simultaneously) first select their qualities and then their outputs. Two possibilities arise in this case. The government can either set a non-prohibitive tariff that leaves a duopoly in the market, or it could set a 18 prohibitive tariff that would result in a domestic monopoly.
Interestingly, the optimal ex-ante tariff is the prohibitive tariff. The resulting domestic monopolist increases domestic welfare over free trade due to an increase in its profits. The average quality increases and consumer surplus decreases relative to free trade. The prohibitive tariff gives greater domestic welfare than any non-prohibitive ex-ante tariff independent of whether the domestic firm produces the high, or the low, quality good. In fact, the optimal non-prohibitive tariff is the one that leaves the foreign firm indifferent between staying in, or exiting, the market (i.e. it makes zero profits in equilibrium).
Unlike the ex-ante tariff, under an ex-post tariff a government can expropriate the gross profits of the foreign firm by setting its tariff level after the firms have incurred their sunk costs of quality. The optimal ex-post tariff is not prohibitive and leaves room for the foreign firm to sell a small quantity of the low quality good at positive profits. Hence, output and consumer surplus are higher than under the ex-ante prohibitive tariff. Further, under ex-post tariffs the government earns positive tariff revenues from foreign sales that partially compensate for the decrease in the domestic firm's profits (that are lower due to foreign competition).
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Consequently, domestic welfare is higher under ex-post tariffs.
This result is in contrast to what has been shown for output subsidies where government commitment increases welfare. In our model the government has at its disposal only one instrument to achieve three targets: to shift rents to the domestic firm and to correct for output and quality investment distortions due to the firms' market power. The government has a second mover advantage in the ex-post game and achieves greater welfare by setting the tariff level after the firms have incurred the sunk costs of quality.
Below, we first analyze the domestic monopoly resulting from an ex-ante prohibitive tariff. We then show that domestic welfare is higher under a prohibitive tariff than under any non-prohibitive tariff. smaller number of consumers served under a prohibitive tariff results in lower consumer surplus. However, the increase in the domestic firm's profits due to the prohibitive tariff more than compensates for the decrease in consumer surplus. As a result, domestic welfare under a domestic monopolist is greater than under free trade, independently of whether free trade imports are of high, or low, quality. In contrast, due to zero tariff revenues, substantially lower output, and only slightly higher profits for the domestic firm, domestic welfare under the ex-ante prohibitive tariff is lower than under the optimal ex-post tariff.
.2.2. The non-prohibitive optimal tariff
To complete our analysis, we also consider non-prohibitive ex-ante tariffs. We show that the government imposes the maximum tariff that still leaves a duopoly in the market. Under the maximum non-prohibitive tariff the foreign firm makes zero profits. Independent of whether the foreign firm is high, or low, quality, domestic welfare under this tariff is lower than under the prohibitive tariff. Below we briefly present the analysis for the ex-ante non-prohibitive tariffs. We consider 20 the case where the foreign firm is the high, or low, quality producer.
.2.2.1. High quality foreign firm
The last stage is the same as in the ex-post game and the equilibrium outputs are given by (6). In the second stage, firms choose quality levels simultaneously to s , from (6) the focs for the domestic and the foreign firm are, respectively: 1 2 2 2 l 2 2m s8 2 2l 1 l 1 8m 1 2lmd
20 A more detailed treatment of non-prohibitive tariffs is given in Herguera et al. (1997) .
Since Eqs. (14) and (15) cannot be solved analytically for l and m, we proceed as 21 follows. Dividing (14) and (15), we obtain an equation involving only l and m.
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Solving for m and choosing the positive root we get m(l). To plot m(l) we need first to determine the relevant range for the quality ratio l. Note that for t 5 0 (free for which the foreign firm still stays in the market, making zero profits. To determine t and its respective qualities s ,s , we solve the system of focs (14) s d
and (15) together with the zero-profit condition for the foreign firm. We thus ] 2 obtain the maximum tariff t 5 0.02765u and the respective ratio of qualities Plotting m(l)in this range, we see that dm /dl . 0. Further, substituting m(l) in 24 (14) and (15) we obtain s (l) and s (l). By plotting these expressions, it is seen 1 2 that s (l) is increasing and s (l) is decreasing with l. Moreover, by plotting
we see that dl /dt . 0 for all l in the relevant range.
1 Therefore, as the tariff on the imports increases, the foreign firm decreases and the domestic firm increases its quality level (see Fig. 1 ). Further, substituting s (l), i i 5 1,2 and t(l) in (6) and plotting in the relevant range, we see that with an increase in the tariff the profits of the foreign (domestic) firm decrease (increase) with the level of the tariff. Second, consumer surplus initially decreases and then increases with the tariff and reaches its maximum under free trade. Third, domestic welfare increases with the import tariff (Fig. 2) . Hence, the welfare maximizing ] 2 non-prohibitive tariff is t 5 t 5 0.02765u . The equilibrium outcome is:
Since domestic welfare under the optimal non-prohibitive ex-ante tariff is lower 1 ] 4 * than under the prohibitive tariff (TW , TW 5 0.0625u ), the government will 23 This is so, because the ratio of qualities is strictly increasing in the tariff level (see below). 24 The analytical expressions of m(l), s (l), t(l) etc. are available from the authors upon request.
i Fig. 1 . Foreign high quality: Quality choice and tariffs. optimally set a prohibitive tariff in the ex-ante game. The reason is as follows. Under a non-prohibitive tariff, domestic production is low quality and the domestic firm's profits are substantially lower than when the domestic firm is a monopolist selling the single (high) quality good. The tariff revenues and the increase in consumer surplus (resulting from the non-prohibitive tariff) do not compensate for the decrease in the domestic firm's profit. Thus, domestic welfare is higher under the prohibitive ex-ante tariff.
.2.2.2. Low quality foreign firm
Following similar steps as above, we determine the foreign and domestic firms' quality in the second stage as functions of the level of tariff imposed on the loŵq uality foreign firm. Defining l 5 1 /l 5 s /s and m 5 1/m 5 t /s and using the 1 2 2 outcome of the last stage of the game (given by (10)), the focs for the domestic 25 and the foreign firm, respectively, are: Figs. 3 and 4 summarize our findings. First, both firms lower their quality level as the import tariff increases. Second, the foreign (domestic) firm's profits decrease (increase) with the level of the tariff. Third, consumer surplus decreases, while domestic welfare increases, with the tariff level.˜T he government thus optimally sets the maximum ex-ante tariff, 
. Bertrand competition
Our qualitative results do not change under price competition. As in quantity competition, there is a unique equilibrium under ex-post optimal tariffs, where the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. Comparing with free trade, quality reversal is observed under ex-post tariffs whenever imports are of high quality under free trade.
The underlying reason for quality reversal under Bertrand competition is somewhat different than under Cournot competition. Anticipating that the higher the quality level it chooses at the first stage, the higher the tariff on imports will be, a high quality foreign firm selects a substantially lower quality in order to save on quality costs. Given that the foreign firm's quality is not too high, the domestic firm can increase its profits by selecting a higher quality level than that of its rival, becoming thus the high quality producer. Similar to quantity competition, under ex-post optimal tariffs a market structure with a high quality foreign firm and a low quality domestic firm is not sustainable in equilibrium.
As under Cournot competition, equilibrium qualities under ex-post tariffs are lower than under free trade. Compared to free trade and ex-ante tariffs, domestic welfare is higher under ex-post tariffs (except for the case where the domestic firm is the high quality producer under free trade). The quality reversal substantially increases the domestic firm's profits thus increasing domestic welfare. This strong rent shifting effect dominates the two negative effects (fall in consumer surplus and tariff revenues) and is the reason behind the higher level of domestic welfare under the ex-post tariff. Nevertheless, the ex-ante optimal tariff is non-prohibitive and leads to higher domestic welfare whenever the domestic firm produces the high quality good. The rent shifting effect is not strong enough in this case and as a result the reduction in consumer surplus leads to lower domestic welfare under ex-post tariffs. This is contrary to what is observed under Cournot competition. The above results are summarized in the following proposition (see Appendix A for a proof). 
. Conclusion
Given that a significant portion of intra industry trade is characterized by different quality levels, the study of strategic trade policy in such industries is of major importance. In this paper we present some new results on the effect of ex-ante and ex-post tariffs in a vertically differentiated home market duopoly. We show that for most cases ex-post tariffs result in higher welfare than any ex-ante 26 tariff. Under ex-post tariffs the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. Further, our qualitative results are robust to output and price competition.
Our results are important as they highlight the fact that ex-post optimal tariffs can be a welfare improving policy tool in a vertically differentiated industry. This is contrary to what has been observed in subsidy games, where ex-ante optimal subsidies are welfare improving. We obtain this result for two reasons. First, in our model the government commits to a specific tariff level and not to a tariff schedule (i.e., tariffs contingent on the quality of imports). Secondly, the government has at its disposal only one instrument to achieve three targets: shift rents to the domestic firm, and correct for the output and quality investment distortions due to the firms' market power. An ex-post tariff is more effective than an ex-ante tariff as the government chooses its policy level after the firms have borne their quality costs. Knowing that the higher its quality level in the first stage, the higher the ex-post tariff will be, the foreign firm invests less in quality and as a result faces a lower tariff. Due to the lower tariff and quality costs the foreign firm makes positive profits. Decreased investment in quality on the part of the foreign firm lowers the competitive pressure on the domestic firm which responds optimally by investing less in quality.
In our model, the long term view of the rent shifting effect (Grossman, 1988 ) is different than the short term view as given in Brander and Spencer (1985) . The rent transfer effect due to a tariff in our model is often of a higher order of magnitude as quality configurations change under ex-post tariffs. In the presence of ex-post optimal tariffs the domestic firm always produces the high quality good and earns a much higher level of profits. An ex-post optimal tariff effectively transfers revenues from the foreign firm (high quality under free trade) to the domestic firm (high quality under ex-post tariffs). As a result, the effect on domestic welfare is more dramatic than under ex-ante tariffs.
In our model, tariffs affect both investment in quality and market structure in an important way. Under ex-post tariffs the domestic firm is always the high quality producer. The ex-post tariff results in quality switching when the domestic firm offers the low quality good under free trade. In the presence of the ex-post tariff both the foreign and domestic firms lower their quality investment. Except for the case in which firms compete in prices and the foreign firm is low quality, the optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and is thus greater than the optimal ex-post tariff. The resulting monopolist sells a lower quality and output in the market. Comparing with ex-post tariffs consumer surplus and tariff revenues are lower under an ex-ante tariff.
There are a number of limitations in our analysis. First, we focus on import tariffs only and do not consider domestic output subsidies. In a related paper (Herguera et al., 1997) we confirm that ex-ante output subsidies are welfare improving in vertically differentiated industries too. We further show that if a government can commit to a policy instrument in the first stage, but not to its level (as in Hwang and Schulman, 1993) , it prefers import tariffs over output subsidies. Second, we do not consider multiple instruments (as in Dixit, 1988 and Collie, 1991) . Whether a government can attain the first best outcome with the use of multiple policy instruments, and if so what set of tools would be necessary to achieve this target, is a question for further investigation. Third, we do not study retaliation games between the foreign and domestic government.
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